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From war economy to peace economy? 
 
Draft 
 
by Jonathan Goodhand, SOAS, University of London 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to provide an analytical framework for understanding the contemporary 
dimensions of the Afghan war economy and the implications for current efforts to build 
peace.1 “Winning the peace” will depend in no small part on international and domestic 
efforts to transform the war economy into a peace economy.  
 
Key points emphasized are: 
 
The dearth of empirically-based research on the war economy. Policies have 
frequently been based on limited data and questionable assumptions. The paucity of 
quantitative and qualitative data on the war economy has held back efforts to respond to the 
problem. Afghanistan has been an “orphaned conflict” for more than a decade – this applies 
not only to earlier international attempts to contain rather than resolve the conflict, but also 
to the lack of serious research inside the country.2  This paper3 draws upon a combination of 
primary research and secondary sources, however hard data is difficult to come by and 
frequently unreliable. The rural economy remains to a large extent statistically unknown.4 
Emerging policy is based therefore upon a limited understanding of the processes at work. 
There is an urgent need to “skill up” in terms of improving understanding through an 
investment in research and analysis.  
 
The regional dimensions of the war economy: Afghanistan is part of a regional 
conflict complex, in other words a “bad neighborhood” which connects other latent and open 
conflicts within the region, including Kashmir, Tajikistan and the Ferghana Valley. 
According to Peter Wallensteen, the Central Asia conflict complex is one of 16 regionalized 
violent conflicts to have occurred since the Cold War.5  The outer borders of this complex 
are unclear but for the purpose of this paper the core Central Asian regional complex is 
defined as Afghanistan and its neighboring countries Pakistan, Iran and all the Central Asian 
states, i.e. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The region 
includes close to 300 million people. Beyond this core regional complex, China, India, 
Kashmir, the Caucasus and the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, are also significant. 
The political, religious and socioeconomic networks within this wider regional complex also 
connect with various conflict stakeholders inside Afghanistan.  Afghanistan cannot be 
disentangled from the wider regional complex(es). A state-centered approach to 
peacebuilding will fail to meet the more fundamental challenge of transforming inter-state 
and non-state relations, institutions and economic structures at the regional level.  
 
The limitations of ‘greed’ based analysis: While international representations of the 
conflict have varied over time and between different actors, a dominant discourse emerged 
in the 1990s which drew heavily on the writings of those analysing collapsed state, warlord 
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conflicts in Africa. This “model” tended to place the war economy at the center of the 
conflict dynamic. It was assumed that the war had mutated from a Cold War “holy war” 
driven largely by ideological motives into a regionalized civil war in which economic 
agendas were the primary driving force. In other words, to borrow David Keen’s phrase, war 
had become “the pursuit of economics by other means.6  One can question two strands in 
this representation of the conflict. First, the tendency to “internalize” the conflict leads us 
dangerously towards the idea that Afghanistan somehow can be treated as though it were an 
isolation ward. However, our analysis of the war economy highlights its global and regional 
dimensions. Conceptualizing the war economy as purely or even primarily an internal 
phenomenon may be politically expedient – since attention is deflected away from the role 
of international and regional players in causing or fueling this economy – but it is unhelpful 
in terms of developing robust and intelligent policies. Second, the view that the war is 
primarily about “greed” rather than “grievance” is simplistic. The opium and cross-border 
smuggling economies enable different groups to wage war, profit, cope or survive. The 
assumption that all actors are engaged in war because of a rational economic calculation 
ignores both the political economy and emotional economy of the conflict and may lead to 
policies which assume that the war economy can be transformed simply by applying 
economic sticks and carrots. It also tends to encourage a belief that the “illicit” economy can 
and should somehow be ring-fenced and treated in isolation from the “licit” economy. We 
will argue that the challenge of “winning the peace” is ineluctably a political one involving 
the creation of institutions that transform incentive systems. And far from criminalizing the 
profiteers, attempts will need to be made to encourage them to invest their accumulated 
profits in the licit economy. Similarly a more nuanced analysis of warlords, their capacities 
and their incentives systems is required. Some for instance may have political ambitions and 
perhaps could make the transition from warlord to statesman. Opportunities will be missed if 
they are viewed only as conflict entrepreneurs or economic agents. 
 
The persistence of the war economy into “peacetime”conditions. The “post-conflict” 
tag can be questioned. The political basis for peace is still uncertain with large sections of 
the population sidelined by the post-Taliban order. Clearly peace would represent a 
“regional public good.” But if the spoils of peace go only to a small group of ‘shareholders’ 
there is unlikely to be a sustainable peace. The beneficiaries of war economies are likely to 
continue resisting central interference and control.   
 
 
2. War, Shadow, and Coping Economies in Afghanistan 
The term “war economy” is commonly used to include all economic activities legal or 
illegal carried out in wartime. Here we use the term more narrowly to distinguish it from 
other types of economy that emerge in wartime conditions. Broadly we can identify three 
types of economy – the war, shadow and coping economies – that enable different groups to 
wage war, profit, cope or survive. Each has its own dynamic and patterns of change. The 
main characteristics of these three economies are: 
 
● War economy. The war economy includes both the production, mobilization and 
allocation of economic resources to sustain a conflict and economic strategies of war aimed 
at the deliberate disempowerment of specific groups.7  Whereas the former involves the 
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generation of resources to wage war, the later involves the destruction of resources to 
undermine the ability of opposing groups to wage war.  
 
● Shadow economy. The terms “black” or “illicit” economies are problematic and value-
laden, particularly in contexts where there is a legal vacuum.8 But we seek here to highlight 
the distinction between those whose objective is to wage war and those who aim to profit – 
while in practice these categories may overlap this need not be the case. In most conflicts 
there are actors who profit from conflict. However, unlike the conflict entrepreneur, the 
economic entrepreneur operating as part of a shadow economy may have an interest in peace 
– if peace can enable the maintenance or increase of profits. 
 
● Coping economy. The term coping economy refers to population groups that are coping 
(i.e. using their asset-base non-erosively) or surviving (i.e. using their asset based erosively). 
These categories are not static and change over time according to the influence of changing 
political regimes and various external shocks. While direct agricultural production tends to 
remain an important part of this economy, households tend to diversify into a range of on-
farm and off-farm activities to cope or survive.  
Table 4.1 presents a typology of these three economies as applied to the case of 
Afghanistan. While in practice the distinctions among them are not as neat and clear as the 
table implies, the typology is useful as an analytical framework to understand the particular 
characteristics of war, and peace, economies in that country. 
 
Table 4.1 Afghanistan: Economies, Actors, Motives and Activities 
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 The war economy The shadow economy The coping economy 
Who?  
Key actors 
Commanders, “conflict entrepreneurs,” 
fighters, suppliers of arms, munitions, 
equipment. 
Profiteers, transport sector, businessmen; drugs 
traffickers, “down-stream” actors (truck drivers, 
poppy farmers) 
Poor families and communities – the 
Afghan majority.  
To make a profit on the margins of the conflict. 
Entrepreneurs profit from the lack of a strong state 
and a highly liberal economy 
Peace could be in their interest if it encourages 
long-term investment and licit entrepreneurial 
activity 
To cope and maintain asset bases through 
low-risk activities, or to survive through 
asset erosion 
Peace could enable families to move 
beyond subsistence 
 
Why? 
Motivations 
and incentives 
for war or 
peace 
 
To fund the war effort or achieve military 
objectives 
Peace may not be in their interest as it may 
lead to decreased power, status and wealth  
Fighters may have an interest in peace if 
there are alternatives sources of livelihood 
Peace requires alternatives to the shadow economy otherwise a criminalized war economy will 
become a criminalized peace economy 
How?  
Key activities 
and 
commodities 
Taxation of licit and illicit economic 
activities (opium, smuggled consumer 
goods, lapis and emeralds, wheat, land tax).  
Money, arms, equipment and fuel from 
external state and non state actors 
Printing money 
Economic blockades of dissenting areas  
Destruction of means of economic support 
Asset stripping and looting  
Aid manipulation 
Opium economy  
Cross-border smuggling under ATTA agreement 
Mass extraction of natural resources (timber, 
marble)  
Smuggling of high-value commodities (emeralds, 
lapis, antiquities, rare fauna) 
Hawalla (currency order and exchange system) 
Aid manipulation  
Employ diverse livelihood strategies to 
spread risk  
Subsistence agriculture 
Petty trade and small businesses 
On-farm and off-farm wage labor 
Labor migration and remittances 
Redistribution through family networks  
Humanitarian and rehabilitation 
assistance 
What effects? 
Impacts 
Disruption to markets and destruction of 
asset bases 
Violent redistribution of resources and 
entitlements 
Impoverishment of politically vulnerable 
groups 
Out-migration of educated 
Political instability in neighboring countries 
e.g. circulation of small arms, growth of 
militarized groups 
Concentrates power and wealth 
Inflationary effects 
Undermines patron–client relationships, increasing 
vulnerability  
Smuggling circumvents Pakistan”s customs duty 
and sales tax, impacting revenue collection and 
undercutting local producers   
Increased drug use 
Coping may reinforce social networks, 
but survival may lead to negative or 
regressive coping strategies. 
Lack of long-term investment 
Long-term effects on human and social 
capital – lowering levels of health, 
education, strain on social networks etc. 
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Source: Adapted from Pain and Goodhand, “Afghanistan: Current Employment and Socio-economic Situation and Prospects,” 
International Labour Organisation, Infocus program on crisis response and reconstruction, Working Paper no. 8 (March 2002), 2. 
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3. Contemporary Dimensions of the Afghan Political Economy 
 
The historical development of the war economy has been dealt with elsewhere9. In the 
following section we attempt to map out some of contemporary features of the Afghan 
political economy.  While conflict has led to profound transformations there are also 
important continuities with the past. The current political economy builds upon much 
older patterns of human organization and interaction. For instance the drugs, smuggling 
and religious networks draw upon pre-war social networks based on qawm10 and tribal 
loyalties. Warlords and profiteers play new games by old rules, mobilizing the “economy 
of affection”, just as other rulers have throughout Afghan history.  
 
The war and shadow economies have persisted and in some respects been re-invigorated 
in the post-Taliban order. Afghanistan is reverting to the pattern of governance of the 
early 1990s, with regional warlords re-establishing control over personal fiefdoms. While 
warlords control the smuggling and drugs trades, which in turn fund their own private 
militias, there are few incentives for engaging with the embryonic central state.  In 
addition, many of the international/regional dimensions of the Afghan political economy 
are still present.  
 
War Economy 
 
While international attention has tended to focus on drugs in relation to the war economy 
it is important to remember that external resource flows including arms, ammunition, fuel 
and financial support from state and non-state actors in the region have probably been 
more significant than internally generated revenue. During the 1980s, Afghanistan 
received more than 3 million tonnes of military supplies making the country the world’s 
largest per capita arms recipient. There are estimated to be around 10 million small arms 
and light weapons (SALW) currently in circulation.11  
The war economy needs to be located within a global and regional framework. 
Strategies of reproduction adopted by states play themselves out beyond national borders. 
Pakistan’s pursuit of strategic depth in relation to India for instance has had profound 
implications in terms of Afghanistan’s political economy. There have also been regional 
“blow-back” effects, most seriously in Uzbekistan – where the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan challenges the legitimacy of the state – and in Pakistan where armed proto-
Taliban groups have caused growing instability and may threaten the long-term security 
of the state.12  
The regional dimensions of the war economy appear to be deeply entrenched and 
have persisted beyond the Taliban phase of the conflict. In addition, warring groups 
continue to develop and utilize extremely sophisticated ways of operating in and 
exploiting regional and global economies – Duffield’s description of warlords who “act 
locally, but think globally” is an apt one.13 These conflict entrepreneurs have developed 
their “asset portfolios” by building up a command over the means of violence and 
developing links to global markets. As a result, warlords have access to sophisticated 
weaponry and lootable resources while fighters can be recruited for one meal a day.   
Warring groups have always depended on external support from international and 
regional actors and few have ever been purely self-financing. General Rashid Dostam, a 
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UF commander based in Maza-e-Sharif, for instance, is currently guarded by a close 
protection unit seconded from the Special Forces of Uzbekistan. There are indications 
that elements within Pakistan’s ISI are supporting Hekmatiya’s Hezb-i Islami and 
Taliban forces. Russia continues to provide arms to the Shuri-nizar in the north-east14.  
In addition, a range of strategies have been utilized to generate resources 
internally, including pillage, protection money, controlling trade, land and markets, 
appropriating aid and the smuggling of goods, people and drugs. Moreover, various 
economic strategies of war have been pursued, including the economic blockade of 
Hazarajat by the Taliban, their scorched earth tactics on the Shamoli Plains, the deliberate 
destruction of rural infrastructure by the Soviets and more random and opportunistic 
forms of violence and criminality (as occurred in Kabul and Kandahar during the early 
1990s). While both organized and random violence lead to processes of dispossession 
and the violent redistribution of entitlements, “roving” rather than “stationary” bandits 
have had the most damaging effects on infrastructure and markets. The loss of a 
monopoly of violence in a particular locale creates incentives for more predatory 
behavior. For instance in 1998 when fighting between Dostam and a rival general broke 
out in Mazar-i-shariff, trade with Uzbekistan was disrupted, leading to greater militia 
extortion of the rural population.15 There was hoarding of food by the army and increased 
looting and selling of booty in Central Asian markets. 
The opium and smuggling economies also continue to play an important role in 
sustaining the war economy. Reports suggest that in Kandahar, customs revenues 
generate around $18 million per annum while as much as $50 million is generated in 
Herat16. Not surprisingly, current struggles between warlords are thought to be related to 
control over trade routes and markets. For instance clashes between Ismael Khan and Gul 
Afgha in the West are at least partly over control of lucrative trade routes coming through 
that part of the country. In Nangarhar clashes in the wake of the assassination of Abdul 
Qadir one of the vice presidents of the Transitional Administration in July 2002 have 
been linked to control of trade routes for smuggling heroin and other goods into 
Pakistan.17  
According to Johnson et al., one year after the signing of the Bonn Agreement 
there remained around 70,000 men in regular forces and another 100,000 irregular militia 
members.18  There are still strong bottom-up incentives to engage in violence. The 
demand for protection and the lack of alternative livelihoods remain powerful 
motivations to join military groups. As Hirshleifer notes, the poor may have a 
comparative advantage in violence as they have less to lose.19 As a result, warlords will 
likely continue to play an important role given the strong demand for security.  
 
Shadow Economy 
 
While the interests of the conflict entrepreneur and the profiteer may often coincide, this 
has not always been the case. For instance, while transport merchants may have had 
extremely close links to the Taliban, their interests did not always coincide with those of 
the front-line commanders. In fact at certain times their objectives have worked against 
one another. For example profiteers undermined the Taliban’s economic blockade of 
Hazarajat by keeping trading networks open. Similarly, in 1995 the Taliban offensive on 
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Herat was bankrolled by Pakistani traders looking to capture the trade routes and markets 
in the West, but this was against the advice of Pakistani military advisers20.  
 
Clearly however, markets and profits are regulated by access to political power 
and the means of violence. While in the 1950s the Afghan merchant class were politically 
weak and heavily taxed, by the 1980s and 1990s, the transport sectors in the Pakistani 
cities of Peshawar and Quetta were an important political force, due largely to their close 
ties with military groups. Markets in the East have become increasingly articulated 
towards Pakistan. Borders have become areas of high risk but high opportunity where 
deals are cut between profiteers and conflict entrepreneurs. As poppy moves from 
farmers’ fields across borders there is a five-fold increase in price. The largest profits are 
made smuggling across-borders, a trade that is dominated in the south by Baluchi 
traffickers with Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani passports. Beyond borders, prices increase 
again. For instance in the Tehran wholesale market there is a six-fold increase in prices 
from Pakistan’s border areas. Opiate trafficking profits in the countries neighboring 
Afghanistan amounted to some $4 billion in 2002, of which $2.2 billion went to criminal 
groups in Central Asia.21 
The shadow economy has led to a growing differentiation among population 
groups. For example, farmers with land and capital lease out their land for poppy 
cultivation and are able to accumulate assets while landless farmers who have no other 
sources of credit are pushed further into debt.22  According to UNODC there were 
approximately 15,000 opium traders in the country in the late 1990s (about one trader per 
13 farmers). Profits from the trade have been invested in conspicuous consumption and 
have had inflationary impacts in core growing areas.23 Violent conflict has destroyed 
some commodity markets while creating others. In Badakhshan, for example, the 
livestock trade with Kabul was decimated due to insecurity, but the opium trade with 
Tajikistan has flourished. The informal economy also plays an important role in shaping 
formal economies and transborder trade has undermined the economies of Pakistan and 
other neighboring states. Moreover, while the trading economy has helped mitigate some 
of the impacts of drought it is not productive in the sense that there is no long-term 
investment in infrastructure or industries. Entrepreneurs gravitate towards quick-return 
activities and the profits are accumulated outside the country. Without a strong state and 
a legal framework, there are few incentives to make the shift towards longer-term 
productive activities. 
 The shadow economy has led to the reconfiguring of regional networks and has 
had considerable costs for neighboring states. Criminal organizations have become 
embedded in the region and the shadow economy undermines the formal economies of 
surrounding countries. The open trade regime of Afghanistan compared to the restrictive 
trade regimes of neighboring countries creates powerful incentives for smuggling. Cross-
border smuggling circumvents Pakistan’s custom’s duties and sales tax with its 
consequent impacts on revenue collection and the undercutting of local producers. In 
1992 the loss in customs revenues to Pakistan was  $87.5 million, which had risen to 
$500 million in 1995.24 The shadow economy is based upon social solidarity networks 
within the region. Particularly important have been Pashtun diaspora communities in 
Dubai and Karachi with their links to Quetta and Kandahar. 
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Historical experience shows that wartime capital accumulation is brutal and war is 
the most common contemporary form of primitive accumulation. Asset portfolios are 
built upon oppressive working conditions, fear and force. However, the shadow economy 
may also support processes of actually existing development, something that Chingono 
describes in Mozambique as being a “barefoot economy” or a vibrant capitalism from 
below.25 Research in Badakshan revealed that in some respects the opium economy has 
had developmental outcomes although the benefits were unevenly distributed.26 There 
was evidence of accumulation and investment back into the village and the opium trade 
had kept young men in the area who might otherwise have left. It appeared to have 
reinforced rather than eroded food security. On the other hand, the opium economy has 
created new tensions within the village in terms of how wealth was produced and 
distributed. It created a nouveau riche of the young men involved in the opium trade and 
the commanders who taxed and controlled it.  
 
Coping Economy 
Overall vulnerability has grown with the gradual erosion of asset bases across groups. 
Families have either retreated into subsistence or are adversely incorporated into the 
market through, for instance, laboring in poppy fields or children working in the carpet 
industry. Labor has become one of Afghanistan’s primary exports. Remittances are 
central to the Afghan economy, and to Afghans living in neighboring countries. Social 
obligations fuel the remittance economy. Diaspora remittances also increase social 
differentiation – in general families with relatives in Europe or the Gulf are able to 
accumulate, while the remittance economy in Pakistan and Iran is more commonly 
associated with survival. Therefore Afghan households have tended to “stretch” 
themselves over several countries in the region and mobility has been a key component of 
coping or survival.27  
 There is a tendency to assume that those involved in poppy farming or the opium 
trade are either “greedy” entrepreneurs or profit-maximizing farmers. In fact for the 
majority, involvement in the opium economy is motivated by coping or survival. Afghan 
families seek to spread risks by diversifying entitlement portfolios – sons migrate to 
Pakistan, women and children work in the carpet industry, fathers enter share-cropping 
arrangements to gain access to land to grow poppy and the remaining women and 
children play an important role in tending the crop since poppy is extremely labor- 
intensive.28  Only about 2.6% of agricultural land is used for cultivation of poppy, but 
between 3 and 4 million people (about 20% of the population) were by the end of the 
1990s dependent on poppy for their livelihood.29  
 Research in 2003 showed a growing dependency on poppy as a means of 
survival.30 Poppy growing has had an inflationary impact and increased the levels of land 
rents, marriage costs and borrowing. People were taking increasingly desperate measures 
to repay debts including absconding, the sale or leasing of long-term productive assets 
and the early marriage of daughters. Creditors were also using more authoritarian tactics 
to ensure repayment including kidnapping daughters, confiscation of domestic 
possessions and compulsory land purchases. Failure to repay debts has become a major 
source of conflict. An average accumulated debt of $1,835 was recorded in the areas 
researched and in Helmand the average debt was $3,010. Farmers anticipated paying off 
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debts within a two- to six-year period. Therefore many are locked into the opium 
economy for several years into the future. 
Although agricultural harvests in 2002 improved by as much as 80%, the growth 
in production has been uneven. Furthermore the return of almost 2 million refugees is 
likely to have a significant impact on livelihoods and competition for scarce resources.31 
There are reports of conflicts in the North as a result of Pashtun returnees. 
 
The Linkages Between War, Shadow and Coping Economies 
Our schema of the war, shadow and coping economies evidently simplifies reality. In 
practice there are no clear boundaries among these three economies, and networks have 
developed with complex overlapping connections. Incentive systems vary at different 
levels of the commodity chain. For a resource-poor farmer, poppy is part of the coping or 
survival economy; for the landowner leasing his land or for the opium trader it is part of 
the shadow economy; and for commanders that tax poppy it is part of the war economy. 
Opium is simultaneously a conflict good, an “illicit” commodity and a means of survival. 
Different commodities – such as weapons, money, drugs, consumer goods or food – may 
travel along the same routes. The sarafi or money changer, is an important node in this 
network – his services are used by warlords, profiteers, communities and aid agencies.  
 Conflict resolution approaches tend to assume a clear division between pro-war 
and pro-peace constituencies or between a criminalized war economy and a licit peace 
economy. But network war dissolves the conventional distinctions between people, army 
and government.32 The networks which support war cannot easily be separated out and 
criminalized in relation to the networks that characterize peace. Attempts by the United 
States to clamp down on the hawalla system for instance, would have a negative effect on 
the livelihoods of the bulk of the population as well as those of the warlords and 
profiteers. 
 In border areas this intermingling and overlapping of various “licit” and “illicit” 
flows – of arms, drugs, smuggled luxury goods along with wheat, water melons and 
refugees – is most apparent, though not always visible. These borders are places of 
opportunity and exploitation.33 Borderlands are also places of constant flux as the 
geography of the conflict ebbs and flows and the policies of neighboring countries 
change. In Nuristan for example a new infrastructure of roads, hotels and bazaars 
developed due to the need for secure supply routes for the resistance.34 Opium 
laboratories tend to be located close to borders.  
 The shadow economy may well promote processes of development – they link 
remote rural areas to major commercial centers, both regionally and globally, though the 
benefits of this development are unevenly distributed. The benefits of the drug economy 
can be seen in the reconstruction of the villages around Kandahar.35 These economies 
also involve complex socio-cultural and political as well as economic organization, in 
networks of exchange and association. These networks are governed by rules of 
exchange, codes of conduct, hierarchies of deference and power,36 and are reinforced 
through a series of strategies, including inter-familial marriage (wife-givers and wife-
takers), gifts, and partnerships (with family members presenting claims for profit, 
involvement and opportunity). They are not anarchic and do not depend purely on 
coercion. Trust and social cohesion are critical. Counter-intuitively, it may be the absence 
of a state and predictable social relations which engenders greater trust and solidarity at 
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the local level.37 Interestingly, many Pakistanis use the sarafi system even though there is 
a functioning formal banking sector – evidently the informal system provides the 
reliability and predictability lacking in the official economy. It may also be more “pro-
poor” in the sense that the poor are considered by the formal sector to be too risky. 
 International assistance interacts in various ways with these three economies. 
Development aid in pre-war Afghanistan contributed to the development of a rentier state 
and the structural tensions which led to the outbreak of war. During the 1980s, 
humanitarian assistance was the non-lethal component of support to the Mujahideen and 
much of it fed directly into the war economy, with donors being prepared to accept 
“wastage levels” of up to 40%. Aid has also been a significant factor in the coping and 
survival economy, as the second largest sector of the “illicit” economy after agriculture. 
Before 11 September about 25,000 Afghans were employed with aid agencies and the 
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, an international solidarity NGO was the largest 
single employer in the country. In urban areas, particularly Kabul, where there is a large 
aid-dependent population, humanitarian assistance has been critical to survival. Finally, 
aid interacts with the shadow economy, particularly in the current context with relatively 
large injections of resources into Kabul creating a parasitic bubble economy. The US 
dollar increasingly dominates the money exchanges in the cities whereas the countryside 
remains in the Afghani or Pakistani rupee zone.38 There is an obvious danger of history 
repeating itself with international assistance exacerbating the underlying tensions and 
disparities between countryside and city. 
There should perhaps be an additional economy in our schema and this might be 
termed the “emotional economy.” Although it has been rightly argued that war cannot be 
fought on hopes and hatreds alone, the contention that war is purely about interests rather 
than passions can be questioned.39   The ideas and meanings that people attach to events, 
institutions, policies and motives are important. To an extent the madrasas from which 
the Taliban emerged responded to a hunger for social identity. Again, aid interventions 
may have an important impact on this emotional economy by influencing ideas, 
relationships, social energy and individual leadership. Education programs and series 
such as the BBC “New Home, New Life” is a positive example of how aid may engage in 
the battle for ideas. The perceived legitimacy of aid actors depends to a great extent on 
how sensitive they are to this “emotional economy.” 
Finally, in our analysis of the schema we have attempted to highlight the nexus 
between global markets, capital formation, investment and criminality. In Afghanistan 
there have been processes of systematic adaptation by elites to changing international and 
regional conditions. Rather than seeing the war economy as purely a reaction to state 
failure, one could alternatively conceptualize state collapse as being something that is 
actively sought after by elites living on the periphery.40 Wartime economic activities have 
involved processes of brutal primitive accumulation which are likely to extend beyond 
the end of the fighting. A common response of wartime entrepreneurs after a peace 
settlement has been to shift capital abroad or to continue exploiting “illicit” activities or 
high rent market opportunities with little state regulation. Arguably, central authority is 
needed to break up violent primitive accumulation – and to protect the interests of the 
poorest and to bring about structural transformation. Simply attempting to ring fence and 
criminalize the shadow and war economies is likely to have perverse effects. For 
example, a complete closure of the Afghan–Pakistan border and the cessation of illegal 
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trade would create the conditions for a social explosion in several regions of Pakistan – 
GDP in the North-west Frontier Province fell from 3.3% in 1981 to 2.2% in 1998 and 
cross-border trade is central to the coping and survival strategies of border communities. 
Similarly, drug policies in the past have tended to put a higher priority on establishing a 
“security belt” around Afghanistan rather than investing significant resources inside the 
country to create alternative livelihoods and transform governance structures. Arguably 
there has been an asymmetrical focus on the supply side rather than addressing the 
demand in Western countries. With the right combination of (dis)incentives, wartime 
entrepreneurs who have historically been labeled profiteers, economic criminals or 
greedy warlords may perhaps also become builders of a basis of longer-term, more 
legitimate economic success.  
 
4. Policy Implications 
 
The final part of this paper involves a short and necessarily selective exploration 
of some of the key policy challenges for international development donors related to 
transforming the war economy to peace economy.  As President Hamid Karzai has noted, 
security and development are two sides of the same coin. However, peace agreements 
often pay limited attention to the question of economic security. In a country in which, 
according to the World Food Program, more than 6 million people remained vulnerable 
one year after the fall of the Taliban, this is an important question41. A significant peace 
dividend is required. Furthermore if it only involves a small group of “shareholders” the 
spoils of peace may end up legitimizing the war.  
 
One of the main challenges with regard to efforts to support the political transition 
through international assistance is the tension between the desire to support Afghan-led 
development and the need to channel resources where there is the capacity to spend them. 
The main source of capacity in terms of relief and reconstruction efforts is the NGO and 
UN system, who themselves are estimated to employ around 40,000 Afghans. According 
to the Minister for Rural Development over 90% of external aid entering Afghanistan has 
gone through non-state entities.42  As has happened elsewhere, the salaries and working 
conditions offered by international agencies have tended to attract the best-qualified 
Afghans and in a sense have actively de-capacitated Afghan institutions.  
Another, related challenge is the tension between the need for quick impact 
programs which meet humanitarian needs and counteract the immediate bottom-up 
incentives to engage in the war and shadow economies, and the need for longer-term 
support that builds the capacity of the state. Both will have to be pursued simultaneously. 
However, as with the security transition, short-term imperatives should not undermine 
longer-term goals. Again, a regional frame of reference is required. The return of about 
two million refugees strained resources and infrastructure, and in many respects hijacked 
the development agenda in Afghanistan as resources were allocated to emergency 
assistance.43  A regionally-informed analysis might have led development agencies to 
think more carefully about the sequencing of return and continuing support for refugees 
in neighboring countries. 
As Von der Schulenberg argues, the West is not necessarily under-investing but 
mis-investing in Afghanistan and the challenge is largely about how to do more with less. 
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Although the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of UNAMA, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, promised a “light footprint” in terms of international presence, based on lessons 
learned from East Timor, in practice there has been an extremely heavy footprint in 
Kabul and an extremely light – to the extent of being barely visible – footprint outside the 
capital. This has generated negative views towards the international community among 
the Afghan population, and is likely to have significant political effects particularly in the 
Pashtun south which feels excluded by the political settlement and has arguably received 
less in the way of reconstruction and development aid. Policies to eradicate drugs also 
play into this dynamic since the predominantly Pashtun south and east are the main 
opium-growing areas. The UK government, which has taken a lead on this issue, has set a 
target of a 70% reduction in opium poppy crops by 2008 and 100% by 2013. However, 
unless there are serious efforts to invest in poppy growing regions, eradication measures, 
as last year demonstrated, will exacerbate underlying political tensions and conflicts. 
Attracting back educated Afghans is also likely to be a central challenge and this 
depends largely on the provision of basic security and the state’s ability to mobilize and 
redistribute resources. A decentralized and criminalized economy is no basis for genuine 
social and political legitimacy, let alone poverty reduction and social progress. However, 
as already emphasized, attempting to protect the shadow economy will be counter-
productive. The right incentives may encourage profiteers to invest in legitimate 
business. For example, many businessmen involved in the hawalla system could 
potentially make the transition into the formal banking sector with the right kind of 
support and institutional framework. 
The shadow economy has thrived because of Afghanistan’s geographic position 
and transnational social networks. However, these comparative advantages could be 
utilized in relation to the licit economy. Afghanistan has the potential to become a hub for 
regional trade because of its central location, although the pre-conditions for this are 
regional stability, roads and communication networks as well as a strong central 
government. A massive investment in infrastructure concentrated in high export potential 
will be required. At one time, for example, Afghanistan provided 40% of the world’s 
raisin market. There is clearly great potential for developing regional cooperation in areas 
such as water, power and trade. Forms of intra-regional collaboration are already being 
developed or explored. For instance, Iran and Pakistan both made aid commitments at 
Tokyo and have provided assistance in areas such as humanitarian aid and infrastructure 
programs. Pipeline construction talks between Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan 
have also recommenced. 
As emphasized earlier in this section, development assistance also must be 
directed beyond Afghanistan’s borders. The problems of failing states, chronic poverty 
and social exclusion are regional phenomena and need to be addressed as such. More 
thought needs to be given as to how development policies can complement efforts to 
build human security. While a number of the smaller bilateral donors such as Switzerland 
and the UK have explored approaches which seek to do this, the IFIs have to a large 
extent been “conflict blind.”  Privatization policies in particular have accentuated 
tensions and played into greed and grievance dynamics by providing opportunities for 
elite enrichment while stripping away forms of social protection. An attempt by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to link loans to improvements in 
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human rights in Uzbekistan may be evidence of a more politically informed approach 
emerging. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Based on our analysis four general points stand out as guiding principles for 
international policy. 
First, as already highlighted, the historical and contextual understanding of 
international actors has often been a constraint in the past and is likely to be even more so 
now, given the influx of new actors with no track record in the country. Afghanistan has 
fallen off the research map for more than two decades and to an extent understanding is 
stuck at pre-war levels. Given Afghanistan’s diversity – every mountain valley has its 
own micro climate – the need for “fine-grained” analysis to inform policy should be 
emphasized. There is a need to make an investment in developing research and 
analytical capacity. In the long run this means supporting the state in areas where it was 
always weakly developed such as data collection and census making – in order to make 
society more “legible” and therefore more governable. 
Second, international policy needs to be informed by a regional perspective. As 
Clare Short, the former UK Minister for International Development has highlighted, 
there is a need for long-term, sustained engagement with Pakistan, India and the Central 
Asian republics.44 Conflict resolution in Kashmir for example is critical to stability within 
the region as a whole. International governments and development donors may need to 
think more carefully about the coherence of their policies from a conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding perspective. For example, unconditional military support for Central Asian 
regimes is likely to exacerbate the dynamics of conflict in the region which has led to the 
creation of movements like the IMU. Similarly IFI models of transition contribute to 
growing structural tensions.45 States in the region are continuing to pursue policies which 
create incentives for the growth of the war and shadow economies – including the 
tightening of borders which prevent legal cross-border trade, the repression of Islamic 
groups, human rights abuses, the cutting back of public services and privatization 
programs. In spite of their common history, infrastructure and culture, the trend within 
the Central Asian region has been to move away from integration, creating new tensions 
over resources, trade, immigration, and security policies.  
Understandably, the Bonn Agreement is a state centric “road map” for peace, 
focusing on political, economic and security questions within Afghanistan. However, the 
“post-conflict” tag will remain only an aspiration if the regional dimensions of the 
conflict are ignored. A much bolder and ultimately more sustainable approach to 
peacebuilding would be to conceptualize it as a process of regional transformation rather 
than simply a case of putting Afghanistan “back on its feet.” Particularly since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, regional organizations in Central Asia have been weak. 
International actors can play a role in promoting and supporting regional cooperation in 
areas such as security, infrastructure, trade and development cooperation.  
Third, a lesson from the past is that international neglect has been a significant 
factor in the development and expansion of the war economy. The obvious point to be 
made here is that there needs to be the right sort of engagement over an extended period 
of time from the international community. It is somewhat ironic given the past role of the 
international powers, but without an international guarantor – and this in effect 
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means strong US backing for the United Nations – the negative dynamics of the war 
economy will reassert themselves: over decades rather than years. The concern now 
must be that attention has moved on to Iraq. 
Fourth, we have emphasized that to address the war economy, Afghanistan needs 
a credible and effective state. A strong state is required to accelerate economic 
development and poverty reduction, to consolidate peace, to reduce the scope for extreme 
brutality and exploitation of social relations and to withstand the intrusive interests of 
regional powers.46   The danger of a “back to the future” scenario with a return to the 
warlord period is very real. International intervention may make this more or less likely. 
There is a need to develop coherent and complementary strategies which support the 
emergence of a legitimate state with the capacity to provide security, wealth and 
welfare. Short-term imperatives – for example the United States arming militias in the 
fight against terrorism or donors circumventing the state to fund their own “pet projects” 
–should not undermine this long-term objective. It is also important to note, that there is 
support from the Afghan population as a whole for a strong, centralized state.47 
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